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It is now widely believed that taxation contributes to the quality of governance. There are a 
number of variants of the broad argument. The most general proposition is that, if governments 
are dependent on broad general taxation for their incomes, they will, for reasons of self-interest, 
be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and more likely to allow citizen representatives 
to share in governance. From a broad historical perspective, that argument is probably valid. 
The political interactions between states and citizens over tax revenues are however 
considerably more complicated than this. Governments can proactively use their control over the 
revenue collection process to divide their citizens into different, competing groups, and thereby 
increase governments’ own bargaining power relative to their taxpayers. This dimension of the 
politics of taxation systems has received relatively little attention in the substantial literature on 
the topic. This paper summarises and illustrates the ways in which governments can use 
patterns of public spending and tax exemptions to protect themselves from the potential political 
influence of organised taxpayers. 
 
Keywords: taxation; politics; public spending; tax exemptions. 
 
Mick Moore is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies and the founding 
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Introduction 
 
It is close to two decades since I became infatuated with taxation. The relationship was 
premature and, on my part, distinctly adolescent. We barely knew one another. But this did not 
stop me from falling in love. I produced several publications arguing that more taxation was the 
way to improve the quality of governance, especially in those low-income countries whose 
governments were heavily dependent on aid or on the revenues from natural resource 
extraction.1 I argued that case vociferously, in part because most staff of aid and development 
agencies seemed sceptical, and much more interested in how the governments of poor 
countries spent money than in how they raised it. I thought I could detect a whiff of self-interest 
in this position: the proposition that large volumes of aid might cause or exacerbate governance 
problems threatened to damage both the political case for aid and the morale of aid agency 
staff. 
 
Two decades later, positions have changed. Within aid and development agencies, attitudes 
have been substantially reversed: tax now has a host of admirers. Claims that the greater 
dependence of governments on taxation will result in more accountability or democracy are now 
commonplace. Collecting public revenues is now presented not simply as a regrettable necessity 
– the least bad way of raising the money that governments need – but as a potential means of 
actively eliciting a ‘governance dividend’, that is, a more inclusive and accountable government.2 
Conversely, my own infatuation with tax has matured into a more critical affection. I still believe 
that there are potential governance dividends from the greater reliance of governments on 
taxation, but my expectations have become somewhat muted. I now envisage the governance 
dividends to be smaller and less reliable than I had previously hoped, and to emerge only in the 
relatively longer term.  
 
Why have I revised my views? It is not principally because the evidence has changed. In respect 
of contemporary low-income countries, the evidence was never abundant. Like other people 
making similar arguments about tax and governance, I relied largely on a combination of 
deductive reasoning and evidence from history, mainly from Europe, and especially from Britain 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To the extent that, in recent years, propositions 
about the positive impact of taxes on governance have been tested for their applicability to 
contemporary low-income countries, the evidence seems broadly supportive.3 There is also an 
                                                 
1  The earliest and most strident versions of this argument are to be found in Moore (1998, 2004). For successively more 
nuanced arguments, see Moore (Moore 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). Ole Therkildsen was the first colleague to alert me to 
the prevalence of exploitative and coercive taxation in some areas of the world. He referred me to the research of Odd-Helge 
Fjeldstad on the subject (Fjeldstad 2001; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008), which led in turn to a very rewarding research 
partnership with the latter. 
2  Most OECD governments have been suffering from fiscal stress since 2009. Individually, they are ramping up their tax 
collection efforts. Collectively, they have made considerable progress in agreeing to changes that will decrease the scope for 
large transnational corporations to avoid most of their tax obligations. In this environment, any positive perspective on the 
potential benefits of taxation is likely to receive a sympathetic hearing. The institutions associated with large-scale bilateral 
development aid currently are receptive to the same arguments for a different reason. It is becoming increasingly clear that 
the era of large bilateral aid transfers is drawing to a close. An appealing narrative has been constructed around taxation: if 
donors could now help expand revenue-raising capacity in low-income countries, they can look forward to a satisfactory exit 
from the aid relationship; not only will former aid recipients be able to raise their own revenues, but the process of doing so is 
likely to stimulate better governance (e.g. OECD 2008, 2010). 
3  I have recently reviewed that evidence elsewhere (Moore forthcoming), a review that was completed about a year ago. It 
does not take into account very recent research, notably that undertaken or stimulated by my colleague Wilson Prichard and 
based on a new and more reliable date series of national revenue statistics (Prichard et al. 2014a). This new research 
broadly supports the notion of a positive causal sequence running from tax dependence to improved governance (Prichard et 
al. 2014b). Note, however, that the weight of research evidence is now running strongly against the propositions that high 
levels of foreign aid lead recipient governments to reduce their tax efforts (Clist 2014; Morrissey et al. 2014) and that this 
might therefore damage governance through lower tax dependence. 
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accumulating weight of empirical evidence behind the mirror image argument: that the fiscal 
dependence of governments on revenues from oil, gas and mining damages governance (Bulte 
et al. 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Gervasoni 2010; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; 
Neumayer 2004; Ross 2008; Torvik 2009; Tsui 2011; Vicente 2010; Weyland 2009; Williams 
2011). My faith in the governance dividend argument has abated not because of the 
accumulation of contrary evidence, but mainly because I have become aware that its conceptual 
and theoretical bases are not sufficiently broad or robust. The possible political outcomes of 
interactions between governments and citizens over revenue collection are more diverse and 
open-ended than I used to believe.  
 
 
1  Governance dividend theories 
 
There is no space here to explore in any detail the range of arguments deployed by the 
governance dividend theorists.4 The core causal propositions are, however, relatively clear. In a 
manuscript that unfortunately was never published, James Mahon neatly called them revenues 
for regimes arguments: 
   
 If states are dependent for their incomes on broad general taxation – rather than on direct 
control of land, manufacturing industry or natural resource extraction – then they will both be 
generally motivated to help promote the prosperity of their citizen-taxpayers and, more 
specifically, potentially willing to cut political deals with those citizens to stabilise or increase 
the tax take.  
 Given that the experience of being taxed is also likely to mobilise citizen-taxpayers, there is a 
potential for institutionalised state-citizen political bargaining that essentially involves more 
citizen compliance in meeting legitimate tax demands in exchange for more influence, 
through more inclusive and accountable governance institutions, in the determination of 
those tax bills and in the use of public revenues.5 
 
It is unlikely that any governance dividend theorists conceived their arguments as anything other 
than probabilistic and dependent for their validity on context and a range of other variables. In 
particular, there seems to be a consensus that national fiscal institutions should be coherent and 
unified if they are to become the locus of the kinds of political bargains sketched out above 
(Brautigam 2008; Dincecco 2011; Gallo 2008; Herb 2003; Levi 1999; Moore 2008a; Timmons 
2005). But what other variables might affect the validity of the governance dividend 
propositions? There is no space here to do a thorough review. I deal only with two complications 
to the core causal model that I believe are important and under-appreciated: 
 
 More inclusive and accountable political institutions are not the only big political offer that 
governments can make to their taxpayer-citizens to induce tax compliance. Governments 
may also – or alternatively – offer targeted public spending, especially spending tailored to 
the interests of specific groups (Section 2).  
 Governments have considerable scope to tax even more selectively and opaquely than is 
implied in the formal provisions of the tax code by giving ad hoc exemptions to individual 
                                                 
4  For a wider range of references to literature in this tradition, and for a summary of the foundational ‘fiscal sociology’ ideas of 
Rudolf Goldscheid and Joseph Schumpeter, see Moore (forthcoming). The most influential recent social science contribution 
was that made by the late Charles Tilly (1992). 
5  There are, however, a number of significant questions about how, in statistical testing of governance dividend theories, we 
might operationally define and measure such concepts as the degree of government dependence on broad general taxation 
and the size of the tax burden on citizens (Moore 2008b, forthcoming; Ross 2004). 
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taxpayers or narrowly defined groups of them. Far from being revenue maximisers, 
contemporary governments use this exemption power lavishly, especially in relation to 
investors (Section 3).  
 
The common threads here are that, relative to the implicit assumptions of governance dividend 
theories, contemporary governments (a) have more latitude to shape the bargaining agenda 
around revenues, and (b) they may use this to divide citizen-taxpayers into distinct or even 
competing political groups. In the concluding Section 4, I suggest that governance dividend 
theorists have underestimated the degree to which governments are able to take initiatives to 
shape fiscal politics in part because they have been over-influenced by arguments that were 
more valid when governments’ fiscal activities were smaller and different than today.  
 
 
2  From tax bargaining to fiscal bargaining 
 
Governance dividend theories are founded on the notion that, especially at moments of 
perceived systemic political threat, governments might offer more inclusive and accountable 
governance institutions in return for greater tax compliance. The suggestion that they might in 
addition or instead offer particular patterns of public spending received a considerable boost with 
the publication in 2005 of Jeffrey Timmons’ article on ‘The Fiscal Contract’ (Timmons 2005). 
Timmons suggests the following basic model of state-society political interactions around fiscal 
policy: 
 
 Governments tax but also make large recurrent distributional expenditures. 
 Governments are likely to motivate compliance on the part of those citizen-taxpayers on 
whom they are most dependent through compensating policies that most directly address 
taxpayers’ interests. 
 Citizen-taxpayers are potentially divisible into distinct interest groups. 
 Strategically rational governments, which will normally seek both fiscal comfort and popular 
support, will act as ‘discriminating monopolists’, that is, they will segment the population of 
citizen-taxpayers, offer different compensating policies to different groups, and be more 
responsive to those groups that provide more of the total tax revenue.  
 
From these broad theoretical propositions, Timmons derives some hypotheses for empirical 
testing: governments which rely relatively heavily on taxes paid by poor people (regressive 
taxation) will tend to motivate these relatively impoverished taxpayers through social spending; 
and governments that rely more heavily on taxing the rich (progressive taxation) will motivate 
them by providing relatively high levels of protection for property rights. Timmons finds support 
for these hypotheses through cross-country statistical analysis. His statistical tests are in fact 
quite blunt. He used a series of incomplete data sets covering between 18 and 100 countries 
over the period 1975-1999, and had to make some bold inferences from fiscal accounts about 
the division of tax burdens between rich and poor taxpayers respectively. The fiscal data that he 
used are anyway of poor quality. Relevant figures are often not available in the case of low-
income countries (Prichard et al. 2014a). We cannot conclude that Timmons’ hypotheses about 
fiscal contracting are empirically valid. His underlying theory, however, is quite plausible, and 
has informed recent research about changing patterns of fiscal politics in the Americas by some 
of the most knowledgeable contemporary specialists in the subject (Bird and Zolt 2014). It is 
hard to believe that the theory does not accurately capture some of the reality of contemporary 
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fiscal politics. Offers of more inclusive and accountable governance institutions are not the only 
way for governments to induce tax compliance.  
 
 
3  Revenue non-maximising and tax exemptions 
 
Similar suggestions about the extent to which governments can (a) take political initiatives and 
(b) create political divisions among taxpayers emerge from the study of a topic to which Ole 
Therkildsen has recently made a major contribution: the politics of tax exemptions (Therkildsen 
2012). I approach the topic a little obliquely here. Large-scale discretionary – and often opaque 
– exemptions for large (and mainly corporate) taxpayers are a modern phenomenon. But the 
broader phenomenon – special deals for ‘strategic taxpayers’ – is widespread. I begin therefore 
with a few contemporary examples:  
 
 In produce markets in northern Ghana, the daily fees that are supposed to be levied on all 
sellers by market managers are sometimes not actually collected from the larger traders, 
who may end up paying lower fees each month than small traders (Prichard and Van den 
Boogaard 2014). 
 At various sub-national levels in China, government agencies have long been levying 
relatively unregulated quasi-taxes (‘fees’) that are formally represented as service payments 
(education charges, security charges, etc.) but actually reflect mainly the extractive capacity 
of the organisations that collect them in relation to local businesses and residents. Research 
by Eun Choi showed first that larger firms generally paid lower fees relative to business 
turnover than did small firms. It also revealed that, while politically well-connected business 
owners generally paid higher fees than did the less well connected, they were more than 
compensated by receiving in exchange preferential access to loans and other publicly 
provided services (Choi 2009). 
 Post-Soviet Russian governments found themselves very dependent for revenue on a small 
number of large firms. They responded with economic and industrial policies that 
preferentially channelled resources to those same large firms to try to keep public revenues 
buoyant (Gehlbach 2008). 
 
Each of these observations exemplifies a general proposition about organisational behaviour 
that became encoded in what is known as resource dependence theory: organisations are more 
responsive to the agencies that control their critical external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). In the context of public revenue, this translates into the proposition that governments will 
tend to be more responsive to ‘strategic taxpayers’, that is, to large taxpayers that have the 
greatest capacity to trouble the tax collector by not paying in a timely and reliable way. To 
encourage strategic taxpayers to pay reliably, tax collectors will tend to find ways of motivating 
them, whether through reducing their tax bills below the ‘normal’ level or offering some other 
kind of inducement. To put it another way, divisive tax bargaining – doing deals with individuals 
and small groups – may to some extent be normal for governments and tax collectors. 
Contemporary tax exemptions may be regarded as divisive deals at scale. 
 
Tax exemptions are a familiar topic for fiscal historians. For example, the inability of the French 
state to curb tax exemptions in the eighteenth century – and indeed the continual granting of 
them in exchange for up-front cash – has been a powerful theme in explanations for the 
weakness of that state and the outbreak of the French Revolution (Fukuyama 2012: Chapter 
23). But such exemptions are very different in character from those that interest us here: 
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exemptions for capitalist investors, foreign or local, justified in terms of the need to provide 
incentives for capitalists to invest in a particular jurisdiction, and not in an adjacent country. 
These exemptions are characteristic of globalised capitalism and have become more 
widespread in low-income countries in recent decades (Keen and Mansour 2009: 18-20). 
Surprisingly, they have barely featured in the contemporary political science literature on tax and 
governance. 
 
We do not know the actual incidence of tax exemptions for investors in low-income countries. 
Technical difficulties in defining and measuring exemptions are a small part of the explanation. A 
bigger part lies in the secrecy surrounding them. Exemptions are typically granted by politicians 
more than by public servants, and often in diverse, arbitrary and non-transparent ways. The 
literature on the subject is enormous. Economists and tax specialists are near-united in 
condemning the frequency of tax exemptions and the ways in which they are granted. The 
OECD recently assembled data relating to six countries in Africa that suggested that tax 
exemptions on average amounted to 33 per cent of taxes actually collected (OECD 2013). Other 
snippets of information indicate that this figure is probably typical.  
 
Why do virtually all governments of low-income countries routinely give away a large fraction of 
their potential tax revenues through exemptions? We know that globalisation and competition 
among countries for investment is one of the motive forces. Strongly encouraged by potential 
investors and their advisers, many governments fear that, if they do not compete with their 
neighbours to attract investment by granting tax exemptions, their economies will suffer badly. 
But if that were most of the story, governments would adopt more coherent and formal 
procedures for granting exemptions, be more transparent about their decisions, and pay more 
attention to the possibility that they could generate more investment by not granting exemptions 
and instead spending the additional tax revenue on solving the kinds of problems about which 
potential investors are often very concerned, notably poor quality public infrastructure. There are 
motives other than competition for investment behind the high frequency of tax exemptions. As 
we understand in particular from Ole Therkildsen’s recent work on Tanzania, tax exemptions are 
a major source of political funding for individual politicians, factions and political parties 
(Therkildsen 2012). They are also a significant instrument of rule for governments that lack 
democratic legitimacy and/or strong and consistent support from stable political parties, 
organised interest groups or loyal public service cadres. The grant of tax exemptions, as well as 
the threat of withdrawing them, is a way to keep some powerful economic interests on side, or at 
least to deter them from active opposition. It is also, as Alexis de Tocqueville recognised in the 
mid-nineteenth century, a standard technique used by rulers to induce political divisions among 
their citizens: ‘of all the ways to make distinctions between people and classes, inequality of 
taxation is the most pernicious and most apt to add isolation to inequality’.6 My colleague Hubert 
Schmitz reports from field research in Vietnam that the granting of tax exemptions to large 
businesses is seen by small businesses as a significant obstacle to the creation of effective 
business associations that can interact and bargain with government. The interests of the larger 
businesses in seeking tax exemptions drive them into individualistic political strategies. Even if 
sectoral business associations are formed, they are politically weak because the big companies 
are not active members. Rather they pursue individualistic strategies in relation to government 
institutions (personal communication, 1 August 2012). 
 
There are then three motives for contemporary governments to grant tax exemptions: the 
perceived threat of an investment famine if the exemptions offered by competitor governments 
are not matched; the side-payments that may be provided to powerful individuals and groups by 
                                                 
6  From The Old Regime and the French Revolution (1856), cited by Fukuyama (2012: 351).  
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grateful investors; and the creation or exacerbation of political divisions among citizens, 
taxpayers, business associations or any other category in a position to potentially challenge 
state elites. We do not know the relative weight of these motives, but one important 
consequence is likely to be the (partial) political demobilisation of the taxpayer interest. This is 
especially likely in contemporary low-income countries because a relatively small number of 
large companies tends to provide a high proportion of all actual revenues.7 These are the 
strategic taxpayers who are likely to exchange favours with government, including tax 
exemptions, in return for some mixture of making political contributions and paying their residual 
tax bills on time.  
 
Tax exemptions are typically the outcome of interactions between individual companies and 
powerful individual political executives or small groups of them. On neither side do formal 
representative institutions – business associations or elected legislatures – play much of a role. 
The politics of exemptions are typically fragmented, individualistic and secretive. They are the 
very opposite of the kind of encompassing, public political exchanges between states and large 
categories of citizen-taxpayers that are conjured up in the governance dividend literature. 
 
 
4  Concluding comments 
 
I explained at the outset that I believe governance dividend theory to be substantially valid 
today. The purpose of this paper is not to justify my continuing faith, but to explore its limits. Let 
us assume that the reservations I have expressed here are also valid. Why have so many of us 
been over-eager to endorse and promote the rather simplistic version of the theory?  
 
First, it is hard to marshal the statistical and other evidence needed to test governance dividend 
theories through contemporary social scientific methods. The evidence and methods are 
improving, but only slowly. We have therefore relied in part on historical argument and 
deduction. 
 
Secondly, we have not fully appreciated the differences in the character and context of fiscal 
activities and fiscal politics in consolidated states of the contemporary world and those of, 
broadly, the seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. In the earlier period, fiscal politics 
were more likely to take the relatively simple form that underlies governance dividend theories. 
In particular: 
 
 The public fiscal domain was generally considerably smaller. Except during occasional 
periods of intense warfare, governments raised only a few percentage points of GDP in 
revenue, as opposed to the figures of 15-35 per cent that are the norm today. 
 As a proportion of the total population, actual taxpayers – i.e. people who actively handed 
over money to tax collectors – were relatively few.  
 Raising taxes from a much less monetised and more agrarian economy where far fewer 
economic transactions were authoritatively recorded was a more challenging and conflict-
ridden business (Moore 2014). 
                                                 
7  There are two broad reasons for this. One lies in industrial structure: the relative economic dominance of large firms, many of 
them with foreign or state ownership. The other lies in the fact that, because the informality of employment relations means 
that governments obtain little revenue from personal income taxes, they depend relatively heavily on corporate profits taxes 
(IMF 2011). 
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 Taxes were raised predominantly for military purposes, and, especially at the level of central 
state institutions, mechanisms and personnel for spending public money on anything other 
than central administration and the military were rare.  
 
Through mechanisms too numerous to explore in detail here, this combination of circumstances 
was, given other supportive factors,8 conducive to governance dividend outcomes. In particular, 
small numbers of taxpayers could more easily engage in collective action, and, when 
governments felt the urgent need for additional revenue, this was typically during actual or 
potential military emergencies when governance concessions to taxpayers might have seemed 
an acceptable price to pay for urgently needed revenues. Conversely, governments were not 
well placed to engage in the more complex kinds of fiscal politics, outlined in Sections 2 and 3 
above, that make the core governance dividend theory appear a little over-simplified in the 
contemporary world. Governments did not have large routine programmes of public spending 
over which they could bargain with groups of taxpayers. Their grip on their main revenue 
sources was not so secure that they could risk giving selective exemptions to large taxpayers on 
a large scale.  
 
Thirdly, the core narrative underlying governance dividend theory has become strongly 
naturalised within the political cultures of Great Britain and the United States over several 
centuries. What were originally political claims – that paying taxes generates an intrinsic right to 
political representation – have become accepted as if they were causal propositions, that is, that 
taxpaying generates more representative government and vice versa. It is not simply that 
historians tell us that attempts by British governments to raise taxes without granting adequate 
political representation to taxpayers sparked the English Civil War in the 1640s and American 
Independence in the 1770s. It is also that successive generations of British and American public 
figures have subsequently talked and acted as if the link between taxpaying and representative 
government (or democracy) were tight and binding (Daunton 2001). The apparent lessons of 
history seem all the more persuasive when articulated repeatedly by historical actors 
themselves, in addition to the academics who interpret their actions.  
 
Finally, the governance dividend story is appealingly simple. It is therefore memorable, and 
attractive to those who are trying to shape public policy (Roe 1991).  
 
In sum, the governance dividend theory does have historical validity and a strong analytical 




                                                 
8  These other factors include centralised and unified fiscal systems, the prior existence of some kind of representative political 
institutions, and large amounts of mobile mercantile capital that might easily relocate (Tilly 1992). 
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